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The Principle of Democratic Teleology  




In the early 1990s, after the fall of the Berlin wall, legal scholars initiated a debate on the exis-
tence of a right to democratic governance in international law. Many of the adherents to the de-
mocratic entitlement school seem to assume that democratization is a simple shift in the political 
status, a change from one form of government to another. This contribution seeks to analyze this 
underlying assumption by taking a look at the current discussion on democratization theory in 
the political sciences. Through this lens, it will reconsider the international practice and the cor-
responding legal documents related to the existence of a possible democracy principle. In this 
respect, a special emphasis will be put on three areas of potential precedents – resolutions of the 
UN General Assembly, the practice of regional organizations such as the Organization of Ameri-
can States or the African Union, and military interventions in the name of democracy. The analy-
sis will show that the legitimacy principle of international law is, at the same time, more modest 
and more demanding than the claim of the democratic entitlement school. It will be argued that 
democracy is no strict obligation, but rather a teleological principle. States are obliged to develop 
towards democracy and to consolidate and to optimize democracy, once electoral institutions 
have been established. 
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I.   Introduction 
Democracy has for a long time been a non-issue in international law. In 1986, the International 
Court of Justice declared: 
However the régime in Nicaragua be defined, adherence by a State to any particular 
doctrine does not constitute a violation of customary international law; to hold oth-
erwise would make nonsense of the fundamental principle of State sovereignty, on 
which the whole of international law rests, and the freedom of choice of the political, 
social and cultural system of a State.
1 
This changed dramatically in the 1990ies, after the end of the ideological dichotomy of the Cold 
War. The new interventionism of the UN Security Council and a large number of newly emerg-
ing democracies in Latin America, Asia and Africa led to a widespread euphoria about democ-
racy. Francis Fukuyama predicted the end of history,
2 and legal scholars started to discuss the 
emergence of a right to democratic governance.
3 The first major international document address-
ing this issue was the Vienna Declaration of the World Conference on Human Rights, which 
recognized that “[d]emocracy, development and respect for human rights and fundamental free-
doms are interdependent and mutually reinforcing.”
4 
The linguistic connection of democracy and development already shows that the right to democ-
ratic governance is not primarily concerned with the industrialized countries of Western Europe 
and North America. Its principal addressees are developing countries. Democracy differs, how-
ever, from traditional human rights in important aspects. While the latter impose either positive 
or negative obligations on governments and public officials, electoral democracy is addressed to 
the whole society. Furthermore, the Vienna Declaration does not only independently promote 
democracy as form of government, but also emphasizes the beneficial influence of democracy on 
development. This statement turns traditional assumptions of modernization theory, which see 
economic development as a prerequisite of democratization,
5 on its head. Democracy is thus 
promoted as a universal cure for the fight against poverty. It is assumed that it can be instituted at 
almost any stage in the developmental process and in any society.
6 This contribution seeks to 
analyze these underlying assumptions. It tries to reconsider the democratic entitlement thesis 
through the lens of democratization theory and attempts to redefine the claim by making a more 
modest proposal. 
The analysis will commence with the development of an analytical framework. I will clarify the 
definition of democracy and then analyze the principal approaches conceptualizing democratiza-
                                        
1   Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, at para. 263 
(June 27). 
2   FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN (1992). 
3   Groundbreaking: Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 46 
(1992); Gregory H. Fox, The Right to Political Participation in International Law, 17 YALE J. INT'L L. 539 
(1992). 
4   Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/23 (July 12, 1993). 
5   See infra Part II.B.2 for an account of modernization theory. 
6   Adrian Leftwich, Governance, democracy and development in the Third World, 14 THIRD WORLD QUAR-
TERLY 605, 605 (1993). 4 
tion processes (II.). The second part will deal with the debate on the democratic entitlement. I 
will discuss the existing approaches to this topic and propose a more differentiated approach 
(III.).  
II.   Theoretical Framework: Democracy and Democratization 
In this section, the theoretical foundations of democracy in international law shall be analyzed. I 
will first define the notion of democracy which shall be the basis of this contribution (A.). In a 
second step, I will analyze the potential economic, cultural and social preconditions of democ-
racy (B.). 
A.   Definition of Democracy 
Democracy is a contested concept. Although the democratic idea seems to be non-negotiable at 
least in the Western hemisphere,
7 there is no consensus on what democracy actually means.
8 Dif-
ferent scholars fill the concept with different content. Some people propose rather thin or mini-
malist models of democracy,
9 while others advocate thick or demanding conceptions.
10 The 
search for a definition of democracy is complicated by the fact that there is disagreement on 
whether democracy is a question of kind or one of degree.
11 The former concept is a binary one. 
A political system can either be or not be a democracy. The latter, in contrast, is gradual. Democ-
racy is not an either-or-question, but one of degree, of more or less. Both concepts are, however, 
complementary, not mutually exclusive. Even to conceive democracy in a gradual way presup-
poses that we have made an anterior classification.
12 For it would deprive the concept of every 
heuristic value to qualify authoritarian or totalitarian regimes as a democracy to a certain degree. 
Once we have made a binary classification, it may, however, be valuable to distinguish different 
types of democracy on a gradual scale, as long as we do not perceive democracy solely to be an 
ideal concept. The notion of democracy thus has two dimensions: on the one hand, a binary clas-
sification, a distinction between democracies and non-democracies, and, on the other hand, a 
graduation, which distinguishes democracies of different quality. 
Turning to the binary dimension, there are two ways to address the issue of defining the concept. 
On the one hand, we can look at whether the relevant sources either explicitly or implicitly pro-
                                        
7   IAN SHAPIRO, THE STATE OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY 1 (2006). 
8   LAURENCE WHITEHEAD, DEMOCRATIZATION: THEORY AND EXPERIENCE 14 (2002). 
9   See, e.g., Adam Przeworski, Minimalist conception of democracy: a defense, in DEMOCRACY'S VALUE 23 
(Ian Shapiro & Casiano Hacker-Cordón eds., 1999). 
10   See MICHAEL WALZER, THICK AND THIN. MORAL ARGUMENT AT HOME AND ABROAD 21-39 (1994); 
Susan Marks, Human Rights, Democracy and Ideology, 8 COLLECTED COURSES OF THE ACEDEMY OF EURO-
PEAN LAW 51 (1997). 
11   GIOVANNI SARTORI, THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY REVISITED 183 (1987). 
12   Id. at 184-85; Armin von Bogdandy, Demokratisch, demokratischer, am demokratischsten? Zur Steigerungs-
fähigkeit eines Verfassungsprinzips am Beispiel einer Neugestaltung der Verordnungsgebung, in VERFAS-
SUNG - PHILOSOPHIE - KIRCHE. FESTSCHRIFT FÜR ALEXANDER HOLLERBACH ZUM 70. GEBURTSTAG 364, 367 
(Joachim Bohnert et al. eds., 2001). 5 
vide a definition of democracy. On the other hand, we can also establish a proper definition of 
democracy and analyze whether such a concept exists in international law, notwithstanding 
whether it is actually called democracy. At first glance, it seems tempting to go the first way. 
Such an analysis is, however, deceptive. The term ‘democracy’ is used very rarely in interna-
tional legal documents – perhaps precisely because of its vagueness. Where it can be found, its 
meaning is not further specified.
13 The aforementioned Vienna Declaration
14 or the Agenda for 
Peace of the UN Secretary General
15 only allude to the positive effects of democracy on human 
rights, development and peace. Savings clauses of international human rights instruments like to 
recur to the notion of democratic society,
16 without defining the meaning of this term. 
There is, however, one prominent exception: in 2000, the UN General Assembly adopted a reso-
lution under the title “Promoting and Consolidating Democracy”
17 according to which democ-
racy consists of a number of different elements: the promotion of pluralism, the protection of 
human rights, the separation of powers, the rule of law, elections, the development of a civil so-
ciety, good governance, sustainable development, solidarity, and social cohesion. This definition, 
however, appears to be more of a wish list, a conglomeration of desirable ideas and institutions, 
than the attempt to propose a coherent conception of democracy. On the one hand, it mingles 
substantive and procedural issues without saying anything about their interrelation; on the other, 
it does not distinguish between the rule of the political game, the institutional framework of gov-
ernment, and certain programmatic issues,
18 such as social cohesion and sustainable develop-
ment. 
If we turn to the political science literature, we find a number of different definitions of democ-
racy. Some are minimalist, concentrating on elections.
19 Other scholars add elements such as the 
rule of law
20 or the guarantee of certain political rights to their definition. In his influential con-
tribution on political polyarchies, Robert Dahl also includes other institutions in his definition: 
certain political human rights, like freedom of expression, information and association, as well as 
                                        
13   But cf. also STEVEN WHEATLEY, DEMOCRACY, MINORITIES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 128-34 (2005) (noting 
that democracy is defined by international legal documents as a political system in which power is based on 
the will of the people). However, the concept of the will of the people is not less abstract than that of democ-
racy so that this kind of definition is not of much help in specifying the latter. 
14   Vienna Declaration, supra note 4. 
15   An Agenda for Peace, Preventive Diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping, report of the Secretary Gen-
eral, U.N. Doc. A/47/277-S/24111 (June 17, 1992). 
16   See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 14 (1), 21, 22 (2), Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 
171; Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 6 (1), 8 (2), 9 (2), 10 
(2), 11 (2), Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222; American Convention on Human Rights art. 15, 16 (2), 22 (3), 
32 (2), Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123. 
17   G.A. Res. 55/96, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/96 (Dec. 4, 2000). 
18   See SARTORI, supra note 11, at 90 (explaining this distinction). 
19   Przeworski, supra note 9. 
20   See, e.g., Armin von Bogdandy, Globalization and Europe: How to Square Democracy, Globalization, and 
International Law, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 885, 889 (2004). 6 
an inclusive status of citizenship.
21 Other scholars add even further human rights or institutions, 
such as the protection of minorities
22 or social rights
23. 
Defining democracy is such a difficult issue because often the debates on what democracy is and 
on what democracy should be are intermingled. Most scholars advocating a thick concept of de-
mocracy that goes beyond the mere legitimation of governance through elections take an idealist 
position and include their idea of what a political system should look like in their conception of 
democracy. One ideal democracy concept will, however, not be detectable in international law 
because of the great number of different traditions and cultures which shape and are part of the 
international order. For this reason, I would like to choose a different way. As democracy is 
highly contested and malleable at its borders,
24 this analysis shall concentrate on the core, the 
legitimation of public power through elections. A political system may be called a democracy, 
when its government is designated in periodic and contested elections.
25 Elections are contested 
when their outcome is uncertain ex ante and irreversible ex post.
26 
This definition is meant to be purely descriptive and does not contain a normative argument. It 
does not exclude that there are good reasons for other, more demanding concepts of democracy. 
However, the protection of human rights or the implementation of the rule of law are separate 
institutions which can be distinguished from the establishment of democracy and subject to inde-
pendent analyses.
27 It is possible to imagine an autocratic regime observing the rule of law or 
complying with human rights obligations. An autocracy in which the government is appointed 
through contested elections is, however, a contradictio in adjecto. 
As mentioned, democracy has also a second dimension. Recently, Susan Marks has cautioned 
against adopting a minimalist concept of democracy in the realm of international law.
28 Concur-
rently, there is a tendency in international relations to idealize democracy. In this context, it may 
be dangerous to promote undemanding democracy concepts as legal standards. For, if states have 
reached this minimum threshold, they are immune against further critique. Marks thus proposes 
to employ a gradual concept of democracy.
29 But gradual conceptions are, as I have pointed out 
earlier, only a complement, no substitute to classificatory conceptualizations. The critique shall 
thus be addressed not by substituting our binary definition, but by adding a second, gradual di-
mension to our conception of democracy. 
                                        
21   ROBERT ALAN DAHL, POLYARCHY: PARTICIPATION AND OPPOSITION 3 (1971). 
22   Steven Wheatley, Democracy in International Law: A European Perspective, 51 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 225 
(2002). 
23   DAVID BEETHAM, DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1999). 
24   WHITEHEAD, supra note 8, at 15. 
25   See ADAM PRZEWORSKI ET AL., DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT: POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND WELL-
BEING IN THE WORLD, 1950-1990 at 14-18 (2000) (proposing this definition). 
26   Id. at 16. 
27   Manfred G. Schmidt, Ist die Demokratie wirklich die beste Staatsverfassung?, 28 ÖSTERREICHISCHE ZEIT-
SCHRIFT FÜR POLITIKWISSENSCHAFT 187, 191-92 (1999). 
28   Susan Marks, The "Emerging Norm": Conceptualizing "Democratic Governance", 91 ASIL PROCEEDINGS 
372-76 (1997); Marks, supra note 10, at 78-88. 
29   Id. at 81-82. 7 
B.   The Theory of Democratization 
The transition from an authoritarian regime to a democratic system is not only a simple shift in 
political status, but a social process which is influenced by different external factors. When the 
debate on democratization started in the late 1950s, it addressed the issue by analyzing the ‘pre-
requisites of democracy’.
30 In its strict sense, the term suggests that democracy has certain nec-
essary requirements, without which democracy is not able to function. Still today, there are au-
thors who promote such a strict approach and argue that certain cultural environments are hostile 
to democracy (a.). The majority of scholars, however, pursue a more moderate approach. They 
try to identify socio-economic factors which may be favorable to the establishment of democ-
racy. The earliest and most influential school is the so-called modernization theory, which tries 
to establish a correlation between economic development and democracy (b.). Further scholars 
inquire into the relationship of ethnic, social or religious homogeneity and the prospects for de-
mocracy (c.). While the three approaches mentioned so far are concerned with the social envi-
ronment of democratization on the macro level, a further school instead concentrates on the mi-
cro-processes of democratization. Its adherents analyze the behavior of political elites in transi-
tion processes (d.). 
1.   Cultural Prerequisites of Democracy 
The theory of democracy’s cultural prerequisites argues that the establishment of democracy de-
pends on the cultural environment of the respective state. Most prominently, this was put for-
ward by Samuel Huntington, who divides the world into eight major civilizations: the Western, 
the Confucian, the Japanese, the Islamic, the Buddhist, the Orthodox, the Latin American, and 
the African Cultures.
31 Among these, only the Western, the Latin American and the Japanese 
culture are regarded as favorable to democracy. Three further civilizations are supposed to be 
neutral with regard to democracy, while Islam and Confucianism are conceived as hostile to de-
mocracy.
32 On first glance, there is some empirical evidence for Huntington’s thesis. Among the 
about thirty highly-developed states having a per capita income of more than 20,000 USD,
33 only 
states coming from one of the two cultural environments classified by Huntington as hostile to 
democracy are not qualified as electoral democracies by the Freedom House’s Survey of Civil 
and Political Rights.
34 These states are Brunei Darussalam, Hong Kong, Kuwait, Qatar, Singa-
pore, and the United Arab Emirates. 
                                        
30   Seminally Seymour Martin Lipset, Some Social Requisits of Democracy: Economic Development and Politi-
cal Legitimacy, 53 AM. POL. SC. REV. 69 (1959). 
31   Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations?, 72 FOREIGN AFF. 22, 25 (1993). 
32   SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE THIRD WAVE: DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY 
300 (1991). 
33   GDP data for 2004: IMF, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2007, 
 http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2007/01/data/index.aspx.  
34   Freedom House’s Annual Global Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties (2007), 
 http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/press_release/fiw07_charts.pdf. 8 
Nevertheless, Huntington’s analysis is not convincing. There is some empirical evidence against 
the thesis that Islam or Confucianism are per se hostile to democracy. Japan, Taiwan or South 
Korea, states which are molded by Confucianism, can be qualified as electoral democracies. 
Equally, Indonesia, the country with the largest Muslim population can be considered as an elec-
toral democracy. Although certain religious or cultural values, such as the lack of separation be-
tween the religious and the political sphere, may be an obstacle to the establishment of a democ-
ratic society, this is no particularity of Islam or Confucianism, but rather an expression of socio-
economic progression.
35 Religious or cultural patterns are subject to change in the course of so-
cial development.
36 In this context, a short glance into the academic past might be illuminating: 
In the middle of the 20th century, Catholic societies had been qualified by a number of political 
scientists as hostile to democracy.
37 However, many states with a predominantly Catholic popu-
lation have meanwhile developed into stable democracies. It thus seems that culture is no deter-
minant factor in the process of democratization. Impediments which have been attributed to cul-
ture often have other reasons. Therefore, culture is no absolute obstacle to democracy, but at 
most a surmountable difficulty in the process of democratization. 
However, the question of the cultural prerequisites of democracy is not purely empirical. It also 
has a normative dimension. Culture and democracy are interdependent. Thus, if the precondi-
tions for democratization are to be established in a certain society, this leads to a necessary 
change of its culture. From a normative perspective, such a development is not without prob-
lems. In order to illustrate the point, Michael Walzer once introduced a hypothetical example 
into the discussion. Algerian fundamentalists establish a repressive military dictatorship and a 
‘religious republic’ without individual liberties.
38 Walzer assumes that this régime is deeply 
rooted in the political and religious culture of Algeria. In this hypothetical situation, the Swedish 
government allegedly has a chemical weapon which allows the transformation of every Algerian 
into a Swedish social democrat. Walzer argues that it is morally prohibited to use this weapon 
because we would then impose our political and cultural values on an Algerian people which has 
a fundamentally different system of values.
39 
This question does not only concern the Islamic region. In the 1990s, some Asian governmental 
leaders, such as Malaysia’s Prime Minister Mahathir bin Mohamad and Singapore’s Head of 
State Lee Kuan Yew initiated a debate on Asian values. They argued that Western democracy 
could not simply be imposed on Asian societies because they were not compatible with certain 
Asian traditions. Asian societies tend to perceive political communities as a system of obliga-
                                        
35   Pippa Norris & Ronald Inglehart, Islamic Culture and Democracy: Testing the 'Clash of Civilizations' Thesis, 
1 COMPARATIVE SOCIOLOGY 235, 239-41 (2002). 
36   WOLFGANG MERKEL & HANS-JÜRGEN PUHLE, VON DER DIKTATUR ZUR DEMOKRATIE: TRANSFOR-
MATIONEN, ERFOLGSBEDINGUNGEN, ENTWICKLUNGSPFADE 40 (1999); Seymour Martin Lipset, The social 
prerequisites of democracy revisited, 59 AM. SOC. REV. 1, 7 (1994). 
37   Cf., e.g., Pierre Elliott Trudeau, Some Obstacles to Democracy in Quebec, in CANADIAN DUALISM 241, 245 
(Mason Wade & Jean-Charles Falardeau eds., 1960); Kenneth A. Bollen, Political Democracy and the Tim-
ing of Development, 44 AM. SOC. REV. 572, 584 (1979). 
38   Michael Walzer, The Moral Standing of States: A Response to Four Critics, 9.3 PHIL. & PUBL. AFF. 209, 225 
(1980). 
39   Id. at 226. 9 
tions rather than a system of rights, and their values are rather community-oriented.
40 There may 
be two different motivations behind this argument. The first one is of strategic nature. Brought 
forward by politicians, who are beneficiaries of the status quo and who claim the authority to 
define what Asian values are, the argument merely has an apologetic function.
41 
If it is not only supposed to justify a certain government, it has a functional rather than a norma-
tive character.
42 The main purpose is to stress collective values. However, if we understand de-
mocracy as a procedural framework, then the concept has sufficient flexibility in order to realize 
different values and hierarchies of values. Cultural relativism has no answer to too many ques-
tions: Who defines the cultural tradition of a certain people? Who determines the composition of 
the group whose cultural tradition shall be relevant? With regard to the latter question, it is not 
imperative to take the collectivity of the citizens as the point of reference because the population 
can be very heterogeneous.
43 Against this background, we can see that Walzer’s parable is exag-
gerated. It is, of course, not justified to transform Algerian fundamentalists into Swedish ‘social’ 
democrats. However, this does not discredit the promotion of democratic rules in general. 
2.   Modernization Theory and the Socio-Economic Requisites of Democracy 
Modernization theory seeks to establish a relationship between the development of a state and its 
degree of democratization.
44 The work of Martin Seymour Lipset, who claimed in 1959 that “the 
more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy”
45, was ground-
breaking. For this relationship, Lipset offers several reasons. In particular, economic develop-
ment leads to a higher level of urbanization
46 and education
47. Furthermore, economic prosperity 
causes the establishment of a middle class and an increased vertical mobility and permeability 
among classes. Both deprive the underclass of its revolutionary potential and thus support the 
stability of the democratic system.
48 Finally, political elites have to fear less disadvantages in 
case of a change of government, because the relative effect of a policy change is stronger in poor 
than in rich countries.
 49 
Since the publication of Lipset’s theory, several empirical studies have confirmed a correlation 
between economic development and democratization: a higher economic prosperity increases the 
                                        
40   Diane Mauzy, The Human Rights and 'Asian Values' Debate in Southeast Asia: Trying to Clarify the Key 
Issues, 10 PACIFIC REV. 210, 215 (1997). 
41   WOLFGANG MERKEL, DEMOKRATIE IN ASIEN. EIN KONTINENT ZWISCHEN DIKTATUR UND DEMOKRATIE 
91 (2003). 
42   Jürgen Habermas, Zur Legitimation durch Menschenrechte, in DIE POSTNATIONALE KONSTELLATION 170, 
186 (1998). 
43   Ronald Dworkin, Liberal Community, 77 CAL. L. REV. 479, 488-89 (1989). 
44   See the seminal work by Lipset, supra note 30; IDEM, POLITICAL MAN. THE SOCIAL BASES OF POLITICS 45-76 
(1960). See also DANIEL LERNER, THE PASSING OF TRADITIONAL SOCIETY. MODERNIZING THE MIDDLE 
EAST 63-64 (1958). 
45   Lipset, supra note 30, at 75. 
46   Id. at 78. 
47   Id. at 78-82; Seymour Martin Lipset, Kyoung-Ryung Seong & John Charles Torres, A comparative analysis 
of the social requisites of democracy, 45 INT’L SOC. SCI. J. 155, 167 (1993). 
48   Lipset, supra note 30, at 83. 
49   Id. at 84. 10 
probability that a state has a stable democratic system.
50 However, there is no causal relationship 
between both factors.
51 Economic development is neither a necessary nor a sufficient precondi-
tion for democracy. There are important exceptions which disprove a determinist relationship. 
India, for example, has been a relatively stable democracy for several decades, although the GDP 
per capita is below 1,000 USD. On the other hand, several Arab states have not yet developed 
democratic structures, notwithstanding a high per capita income. 
Furthermore, empirical data suggests that economic development does not primarily influence 
the transition to democracy. Economic prosperity rather stabilizes democratic institutions once 
they have developed.
52 In particular, poor democracies face a high probability of collapsing.
53 
Only after having reached a certain stage of development are democracies sufficiently stable to 
survive economic crises. However, economic development is not the only factor that influences 
the democratization process. 
All political systems know informal rules and arrangements in their political process.
54 Such 
mechanisms may ideally complement the formal constitutional institutions and increase their 
flexibility. However, if the democratic system is unstable or defective, such informal networks 
are often used to pervert the democratic rules.
55 The political actors try to strengthen their power 
by relying on particularistic networks outside of the constitutional institutions. Such defective 
democracies are thus likely to break down in social or economic crises or to transform into open 
autocracies. 
How do defective democracies differ from functioning ones? An approach elaborated by Tatu 
Vanhanen takes a rationalistic standpoint and establishes a relationship between the degree of 
democratization and the dispersion of social power resources.
56 If power resources are widely 
dispersed, it is difficult for a specific group of society to suppress other social groups and to es-
tablish or maintain hegemonic structures.
57 The degree of dispersion is related to other socio-
                                        
50   PHILIP COULTER, SOCIAL MOBILIZATION AND LIBERAL DEMOCRACY (1975); Kenneth A. Bollen & Robert 
W. Jackman, Economic and Noneconomic Determinants of Political Democracy in the 1960s, 1 RES. POL. 
SOC. 27, 42 (1985); Larry Diamond, Economic Development and Democracy Reconsidered, in REEXAMINING 
DEMOCRACY.  ESSAYS IN HONOR OF SEYMOUR MARTIN  LIPSET 93 (Gary Marks & Larry Diamond eds., 
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51   DAHL, supra note 21, at 71; ZEHRA F. ARAT, DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN DEVELOPING COUN-
TRIES 33 (1991); MERKEL & PUHLE, supra note 36, at 33; PRZEWORSKI ET AL., supra note 25, at 88; 
MANFRED G. SCHMIDT, DEMOKRATIETHEORIEN 441 (3rd ed. 2000); Bruce J. Bueno de Mesquita & 
George W. Downs, Development and Democracy, 84 FOREIGN AFF. 77 (2005). 
52    Adam Przeworski & Fernando Limongi, Modernization: Theories and Facts, 49 WORLD  POLITICS 155 
(1997). 
53   Id. at 170. 
54   Wolfgang Merkel & Aurel Croissant, Formale und informale Institutionen in defekten Demokratien, 41 PO-
LITISCHE VIERTELJAHRESSCHRIFT 3, 16 (2000); CHARLES TILLY, DEMOCRACY 88 (2007). 
55   WOLFGANG MERKEL ET AL., DEFEKTE DEMOKRATIE 28 (2003). 
56   TATU VANHANEN, THE PROCESS OF DEMOCRATIZATION (1990); idem, Social Constraints of Democrati-
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economic factors, such as economic development and level of education.
58 Vanhanens’s ap-
proach is thus a supplement rather than a contrast to modernization theory. 
Another explanation has been offered by Charles Tilly, who argues that state capacity is the de-
cisive factor for a successful democratization process.
59 Strong institutions increase the prospects 
of success. In contrast, the emergence of autonomous power centers is one of the biggest obsta-
cles.
60 Of course, there are limits: if the state is too strong, political actors have incentives to 
claim exclusive power and to undermine democratization. Thus, informal ‘trust networks’ have 
to be integrated into the public political space.
61 Power dispersion thus continues to have an im-
portant function. However, it has to take place within state institutions and shall not be in opposi-
tion to them. 
Turning to cultural scholarship, we find that democracy depends on the internalization of democ-
ratic values by citizens and political elites.
62 Certainly, the embrace of democratic values does 
not happen over night. They rather have to be learned, internalized and accumulated as social 
capital.
63 They require experience with democratic institutions and a corresponding education.
64 
Furthermore, socio-economic change may lead to a transformation of political values.
65 
Summarizing these findings, we can draw the following conclusions: the functioning and stabil-
ity of democracy depend on several different factors – a democratic culture, socio-economic de-
velopment, stable institutions, the integration of trust networks into the public political space and 
the dispersion of power resources. These factors are interdependent. Democratization does thus 
not only depend on sound institutional design. It is rather rarely an abrupt transition, but subject 
to a gradual process.
66 
3.   Cultural and Ethnic Homogeneity 
The debate on cultural, religious and ethnic homogeneity as a precondition for a stable democ-
racy dates back to John Stuart Mill, according to whom 
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[f]ree institutions are next to impossible in a country made up of different nationali-
ties. Among a people without fellow-feeling, especially if they read and speak differ-
ent languages, the united public opinion, necessary to the working of representative 
government, cannot exist.
67 
In many plural societies where identity is heavily influenced by the belonging to a single cul-
tural, ethnic or religious group, voting often follows social affiliations.
68 It is thus barely surpris-
ing that empirical studies suggest that the probability to establish democracy in an ethnically 
homogeneous society is twice as high as in a segmented society.
69 
Different authors have proposed remedies to overcome the problem of segmentation. The most 
widely recognized proposal is Martin Lijphart’s model of consociational democracy.
70 Lijphart 
proposes to establish a system in which every major social group is represented. He identifies 
four fundamental characteristics: government by a grand coalition, mutual veto rights in order to 
protect minority interests, proportional representation in politics and civil service, as well as a 
proportional allocation of public funds, and a federal structure giving each segment a high 
amount of autonomy.
71 
However, consociationalism implicitly assumes that human identity is unalterable. Yet, identities 
are no natural characteristic of human beings, but social constructs.
72 They can evolve and 
change with time and circumstance although not being infinitely malleable.
73 Research in social 
psychology shows that the interaction between different social groups can be enhanced if it is 
possible to establish a common superordinate identity.
74 Consociationalist models thus run the 
risk of deepening rather than overcoming segmentations in society. This does not mean that de-
mocracy is not possible in plural societies. The solution should instead be to establish voting 
procedures which discourage incentives to vote according to ethnic or religious cleavages.
75 
Such procedures may prescribe that parties have to rely on votes of more than one social group 
in order to be elected, which could, for example, be managed by the introduction of certain 
minimum quota. 
But even the latter form of democratization bears certain risks. Without a consensus about the 
fundamental rules of the political game, incentive-based voting mechanisms cannot surmount 
social cleavages.
76 The recipe in these cases resembles the approaches to socio-economic devel-
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opment. States with highly segmented societies often have a weak institutional structure.
77 Thus, 
formal institutions have to be strengthened and trust in these institutions has to be developed. At 
the same time, it is necessary to establish a common identity. Consequently, nation and capacity 
building in these cases ideally precedes the transition to democracy.
78 
4.   Actor Theories 
While the approaches presented so far have dealt with the macro-environment of democratiza-
tion, the actor theories focus on the political actors involved in democratization periods. Under a 
rational choice perspective, transition to democracy occurs if it is rational for the relevant politi-
cal elites to establish a democratic system in order to pursue their interests.
79 This is mostly the 
case if no political group possesses a clear advantage over its adversaries so that democracy, as 
institutionalized insecurity about the future policy,
80 appears to be the best compromise, giving 
everyone the theoretical opportunity to attain a share of the power.
81 In the period of democratic 
consolidation, democracy survives if the government has incentives not to manipulate the out-
come of elections and if it hands over its power after losing the elections.
82 In established democ-
racies, it is an important factor that politicians trust to have the opportunity to regain power in 
future elections. If such a trust has not yet been established, it is important that the members of 
the parting government have suitable professional alternatives in order to reduce the costs of los-
ing power – and thus the incentives to keep it against the law – as much as possible.
83 Socio-
economic development is thus again a decisive aspect of the political game. Further factors in-
fluencing the incentive structure of political elites are the internalization of democratic values
84 
and the dispersion of power within society.
85 The incentives of the political actors are thus de-
pendent on the macro environment. 
5. Conclusions 
The different attempts to explain democratization draw a complex picture. They do not exclude 
each other mutually, but highlight different aspects in the process of democratization. Transition 
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to and consolidation of democracy do not permit monocausal explanations, but depend on a vari-
ety of different factors.
86 They show that democracy has no necessary or sufficient prerequisites 
– neither a low level of economic development nor a significant ethnic and cultural heterogeneity 
as such exclude the establishment of a relatively stable democracy.
87 Nor does economic pros-
perity lead to an automatic transition to democracy. 
However, despite the lack of causal explanations, there are significant correlations. It is likely 
that low economic development or social heterogeneity endanger the consolidation of democ-
racy. Indeed, these obstacles are malleable.
88 But they are subject to long-term processes that are 
not necessarily steady.
89 Sometimes it may be reasonable to compromise on short-term success 
in order to pursue long-term goals.
90 In certain circumstances, it may, furthermore, be advisable 
to engage in nation- and identity-building before pursuing the establishment of institutions. Be-
cause there is no universally valid formula for success, many political scientists stress the proc-
ess-like character and the unpredictability of democratization. It does not suffice to establish cer-
tain institutions, but it is a “complex, long-term, dynamic and open-ended process”.
91 Even if 
elections have to enter the stage at a certain point, they are not necessarily the first step.
92 Rather, 
democratization is a teleological process,
93 the final objective of which is the establishment of a 
legitimate form of government, but which does not necessarily have to be democratic itself.
94 
III.   Democracy in Positive International Law 
The legal democratic entitlement school tries to establish a right to democratic governance as 
part of customary international law. According to the general definition contained in art. 38 (1) 
lit. b of the ICJ Statute
95, customary law consists of two elements: state practice and opinio iuris. 
Customary Norms are thus principally identified by an inductive abstraction from patterns of 
state behavior. However, there is an important trend in legal scholarship which recognizes an 
additional way of identifying customary norms, particularly in the Continental literature. Under 
the premise that the legal system is perceived as a coherent and holistic system without internal 
contradictions, customary norms may also be justified through deduction. If a certain principle 
follows necessarily from a more abstract principle which has already been accepted as customary 
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law, then the former principle has equally to be part of the custom because the legal order would 
otherwise be contradictory.
96 With regard to the right to democratic governance, we can find 
both approaches to justify a customary norm, an inductive and a deductive one.
97 In the follow-
ing, I will first turn to the latter.
98  
A.   Democracy and Self-Determination 
The deductive approach, which is primarily promoted in European scholarship, tries to deduce a 
right to democratic governance from the principle of self-determination.
99 Self-determination had 
at first a primarily external direction. The principle had its strongest impact in the context of de-
colonization.
100 However, by its incorporation into the common art. 1 of the two human rights 
covenants from 1966
101, it also received an internal dimension.
102 According to this provision, 
the right to self-determination attributes to every people, inter alia, the right freely to determine 
its political status. This internal dimension has been affirmed by the friendly relations declaration 
of the UN General Assembly
103, which also underlined the right to determine the own political 
status. 
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1.   Democracy as Mandatory Consequence of Self-Determination  
There are two different lines of arguments trying to deduce a democratic principle from the right 
to self-determination. The first argument is a contextual one: as part of the Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (CCPR)
104, art. 1 has to be interpreted in the context of the other provisions 
of the Covenant, in particular the right to democratic elections prescribed in art. 25. The right to 
participate in elections specifies how the right to determine the own political system has to be 
exercised.
105 However, it seems more convincing to interpret both provisions in a way that leaves 
them an independent normative scope.
106 If the guarantees of a self-determination principle 
which is shaped by art. 25 CCPR do not surpass the scope of the right to democratic elections, 
self-determination is not needed. In order to guarantee elections, art. 25 CCPR is a sufficient 
normative basis. If one wants to draw further conclusions, a mere connection of and abstraction 
from basically independent principles is not enough. This becomes obvious if we consider the 
practical relevance of the discussion. Within the framework of the CCPR, it does not make any 
difference whether we interpret art. 1 CCPR in the light of art. 25 CCPR because the latter guar-
antees that elections will be held in any case. This is different for the customary principle of self-
determination outside the CCPR. If we interpret this principle equally in the light of art. 25 
CCPR, then the scope of the electoral guarantee would be impermissibly extended over the limits 
of the Convention. 
The second argument is more fundamental. It tries to establish a logical relationship between 
democracy and self-determination. Taking seriously that the right to determine the political sys-
tem is a right of the people, the decision on the political status has to be one of the people, not of 
the government. Such a decision is necessarily dependent on democratic mechanisms because a 
different mode of decision attributable to the people is not conceivable.
107 This ‘logical’ relation-
ship is, however, based on problematic premises.
108 It does not distinguish between the act of 
framing the political system and its actual content, the pouvoir constituant and the pouvoir con-
stitué.
109 The right to self-determination only refers to the former, but not necessarily to the lat-
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ter. History provides examples in which citizens opted by electoral means to delegate power to 
political elites, which then established authoritarian rule.
110 
One solution to address this dilemma is to distinguish formally between the act of establishing a 
political system, and the political system itself. The participation of the citizens is limited to the 
former act. If they choose a system other than democracy, they have, by this act, exhausted their 
right to self-determination.
111 This view can, however, not explain why the act of self-
determination should be irreversible. Votes often do depend on the special circumstances of a 
certain historic situation. However, circumstances may change, just as citizens’ preferences may 
change. Moreover, the composition of the population itself is subject to change. It is difficult to 
justify that the citizenry in a historically accidental moment shall have the power to bind future 
generations. 
Another solution has been put forward by Gregory Fox and Georg Nolte in their contribution on 
‘Intolerant Democracies’. In their analysis, they discuss whether democracies are allowed to 
fight political tendencies directed against the system as such.
112 They propose a substantive con-
cept of democracy in which electoral results may be disregarded in order to prevent an undemo-
cratic opposition to come to power and to protect democracy as such. However, this argument 
implies a predisposition towards democracy.
113 Democracy or even a specific type of substantive 
democracy is considered to be an absolute value a priori. We have, however, seen that the value 
of democracy always depends on the specific circumstances.
114 We can thus stick to what Al-
berto Asor Rosa remarked as early as twenty-five years ago: 
democracy, precisely because it is a system of mediocrites that cannot make itself out 
to be an absolute or an end in itself [...], is a game whose defining feature is that it al-
lows its own rules to be called into question. If it does not, it is already something 
else.
115 
2.   Self-Determination and Representation 
This does, however, not lead to the conclusion that the right to self-determination does not im-
pose any restrictions on the political elites’ choice of the form of government. This is expressed 
in the friendly relations declaration, which declares with regard to the principle of self-
determination: 
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Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing or encouraging 
any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integ-
rity or political unity of sovereign and independent States conducting themselves in 
compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples as 
described above and thus possessed of a government representing the whole people 
belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed or colour.
116 
Consequently, not every form of government is compatible with self-determination. Rather, the 
government has to be representative. Excluded are thus governments which are authoritarian or 
only represent particularistic interests. These considerations are underlined by a further argu-
ment. If the content of self-determination could exclusively be determined by the respective gov-
ernment, the principle would not differ from the principle of state sovereignty and thus not have 
any independent value.
117 
However, representation does not necessarily have to be realized through elections. It may also 
be by government in the public interest, government for the people. The problem will certainly 
be to determine when a form of government can be considered as representative. Unlike democ-
racy, representativeness cannot be determined by the sole existence of certain institutions. We 
rather have to recur to substantial criteria. In this respect, a distinction proposed by Georg Søren-
sen may be helpful. Sørensen distinguishes between development-oriented régimes, whose pur-
pose is economic development as well as the promotion of individual well-being, growth-
oriented régimes, who focus exclusively on economic growth without taking into account its ef-
fects on society, and self-enriching régimes.
118 Only the first type can be regarded as compatible 
with the right to self-determination. A further indicator is the human rights record of a govern-
ment. Not every violation of human rights accounts for the illegitimacy of a government as hu-
man rights violations occur even in the most advanced political systems.
119 However, in cases of 
systematic violations of core human rights, the government would not be representative of its 
citizens anymore. It would be to qualify as illegitimate, and the state would infringe upon the 
right to self-determination of its population. 
B.   The International Practice: Democratic Teleology 
In contrast to the deductive approach, the inductive approach relies in particular on the practice 
of international institutions.
120 The argumentation is based on a thin concept of democracy, 
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which is principally identified by periodic elections.
121 Further support is drawn from political 
human rights like the freedoms of speech, assembly and association.
122 However, democratiza-
tion is more complex than just being the introduction of a simple assembly of certain political 
rights and institutions. The debate in legal academia often seems to presuppose that democracy 
can easily be established in any given state. But the establishment of democracy was already a 
complex and slow development in the Western hemisphere. Many developing countries are in a 
different social and economic situation than most Western states were when they began their 
transition to democracy. When establishing our theoretical framework, we have already seen that 
democratization is a complex and long-term process.
123 Therefore, this section tries to reexamine 
the evidence on democracy in international law through the lens of democratization theory. The 
thesis which shall be put forward is that international law does not know a strict right to democ-
ratic governance, but rather contains a principle of democratic teleology. States are not required 
to introduce democracy right away, but to develop towards democracy. 
Evidence for the emergence of a democracy principle can be found in various fields of interna-
tional law. The following analysis shall concentrate on three areas, which I deem especially im-
portant. First, we will have a look at universal human rights instruments and the practice of in-
ternational institutions, like resolutions of the UN General Assembly (1.). Then, we will briefly 
examine the institutional practice at the regional level (2.), before finally dealing with the issue 
of military interventions in order to establish democracy (3.). 
1.   Practice of International Institutions 
(a)   Right to Democratic Elections: CCPR and UDHR 
One strong indicator for the existence of customary international law is universal treaties, such as 
the international human rights instruments. If states enter into treaty obligations, they express 
their intent to be bound by the treaty norms and thus manifest a corresponding opinio iuris.
124 
The most important treaty norm in this context is art. 25 CCPR. It guarantees the participation in 
genuine, periodic elections, which are supposed the guarantee the free expression of the will of 
the electors. Although socialist states originally argued – based on the travaux préparatoire – 
that one-party systems would be in conformity with art. 25 CCPR, there is consensus among in-
ternational legal scholars today that voters have to be given a meaningful choice in order to meet 
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the requirements of the Covenant.
125 A “free expression of the will of the electors” (lit. b) and the 
“part[icipation] in the conduct of public affairs” (lit. a) is only possible when the voters’ choice 
is not restricted to a choice of persons, but also to one of different political agendas.
126 
The CCPR has, as yet, been ratified by 160 states.
127 Indeed, more than eighty percent of the in-
ternational community have agreed to select their government by free and fair elections. How-
ever, there are notable exceptions – the abstinent states China and Pakistan belong to the ten 
most populous states in the world. Furthermore, the list of abstaining countries shows patterns of 
regional concentration. Especially in East and Southeast Asia,
128 a considerable number of states 
has not committed itself to hold periodic elections. Moreover, the number becomes less impres-
sive when we take a look at the actual state practice. Many of the states having ratified the CCPR 
do not actually practice electoral democracy. According to the 2007 survey of Freedom House, 
only two thirds of the members of the international community of states can be qualified as elec-
toral democracies.
129 Mere commitment to art. 25 CCPR alone is thus not sufficient in order to 
establish a customary principle of democracy.
130 Art. 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights
131 encounters the same problem. Indeed, in para. 3, this norm establishes a right to par-
ticipate in periodic and genuine elections – however, this declaration equally is not supported by 
state practice. 
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(b)   Declarations of the U.N. General Assembly 
A more modest approach is put forward by the UN General Assembly in a couple of resolutions 
on elections and democracy. From 1988 onwards, the General Assembly issued a series of reso-
lutions under the title “Enhancing the Effectiveness of the principle of periodic and genuine elec-
tions“.
132 The first resolution of this series states in its operative part that the General Assembly 
1. Emphasizes the significance of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which establish that the author-
ity to govern shall be based on the will of the people, as expressed in periodic and 
genuine elections; 
2. Stresses its conviction that periodic and genuine elections are a necessary and in-
dispensable element of sustained efforts to protect the rights and interests of the gov-
erned and that, as a matter of practical experience, the right of everyone to take part 
in the government of his or her country is a crucial factor in the effective enjoyment 
by all of a wide range of other human rights and fundamental freedoms, including 
political, economic, social, and cultural rights; 
3. Declares that determining the will of the people requires an electoral process 
which accommodates distinct alternatives, and this process should provide an equal 
opportunity for all citizens to become candidates and put forward their political 
views, individually and in co-operation with others;
133 
The resolution does not contain an explicit affirmation of a right to democratic elections. Instead 
of imposing a strict obligation, the resolution rather gives reasons for the suitability of elections. 
Para. 2 attempts an empirical justification (“as a matter of practical experience”) and emphasizes 
that elections are a necessary precondition for output legitimacy (“to protect the rights and inter-
ests of the governed”) because they are crucial for the enjoyment of human rights. In contrast, 
para. 3 is of normative nature, referring to the will of the people and stressing the necessity to 
implement the latter through an electoral process. 
The resolution was changed slightly in the following years. The successive versions of the reso-
lution contained reservations stressing the autonomy of states to develop their political system. 
Resolution 46/137, which was adopted in 1991, stated in its preamble: 
Recognizing that there is no single political system or electoral method that is 
equally suited to all nations and their people and that the efforts of the international 
community to enhance the effectiveness of the principle of periodic and genuine 
elections should not call into question each State’s sovereign right, in accordance 
with the will of its people, freely to choose and develop its political, social, economic 
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and cultural systems, whether or not they conform to the preferences of other 
states.
134 
Furthermore, in the operative part, it said: 
5. Underscores the duty of each Member State, in accordance with the provisions of 
the Charter of the United Nations, to respect the decisions taken by other states, in 
accordance with the will of their people, in freely choosing and developing their elec-
toral institutions;
135 
Concurrently, the General Assembly adopted, from 1989 onwards, a “counter”-resolution, bear-
ing the title “Respect for he principles of national sovereignty and non-interference in the inter-
nal affairs of states in their electoral processes”,
136 which stresses in its operative part the right of 
peoples to determine their political, economic and social system: 
[The General Assembly] 
1. Reiterates that, by virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of 
peoples enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, all peoples have the right, 
freely and without external interference, to determine their political status and to pur-
sue their economic, social and cultural development, and that every State has the 
duty to respect that right in accordance with the provisions of the Charter; 
2. Affirms that it is the concern solely of peoples to determine methods and to estab-
lish institutions regarding the electoral process, as well as to determine the ways for 
its implementation according to their constitution and national legislation; 
[…] 
4. Urges all States to respect the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs 
of States and the sovereign right of peoples to determine their political, economic 
and social system.
137 
At first glance, the two strands of resolutions seem to contradict each other.
138 On the one hand, 
the pro-elections resolutions praise the advantages of electoral systems of government. But these 
praises are taken away with the other hand emphasizing the importance of national autonomy to 
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choose a proper political system without external interference. However, the contradiction is not 
as great as some scholars would like it to appear. Even if peoples have the right to determine 
their political, economic and social system, this does not mean that the choice of the political 
system is unlimited. As we have seen in the previous section, the government has to be represen-
tative.
139 Para. 5 of resolution 46/137 underlines this by emphasizing that the choice has to be 
made “in accordance with the will of the people”. Considering the difficulties of equalizing the 
pouvoir constituant and the pouvoir constitué,
140 this does, however, not constitute an automatic 
obligation to democracy. 
The resolutions rather suggest a teleological attitude towards elections and democracy. They em-
phasize the desirability of electoral institutions without imposing a strict obligation. In our analy-
sis of the democratization theories, we have seen that democratization is perceived as a long-
term process rather than a shift from one status to another.
141 By using the terms “developing” or 
“enhancing” in the context of electoral institutions, the language of the resolution stresses ex-
actly this process-like character of democratization. The establishment of electoral institutions is 
only one element, not necessarily the first in this process. 
These results are underlined by several other resolutions and declarations of the international 
community. The primary example is General Assembly resolution 55/96, titled “Promoting and 
Consolidating Democracy”, which was adopted in 2000. The central claim of this resolution is to 
“call upon states to promote and consolidate democracy”.
142 Thus, it equally uses a process-
oriented terminology by employing terms such as “promoting” and “consolidating”. In particu-
lar, the latter term is often used in the social sciences to describe the teleological character of 
democratization processes.
143 Furthermore, the term “consolidation” underlines that democracy 
is understood both as a classificatory and as a gradual concept in international law. The process 
of democratization certainly marks the process leading to a transition to democracy. It does, 
however, not stop there, but requires also a subsequent consolidation. 
The aforementioned Vienna Declaration of Human Rights
144 also contains a paragraph dedicated 
to democratization: 
The World Conference on Human Rights reaffirms that least developed countries 
committed to the process of democratization and economic reforms, many of which 
are in Africa, should be supported by the international community in order to suc-
ceed in their transition to democracy and economic development.
145 
Again, the language rather focuses on democratization and the process of transition than on the 
status of democracy. Finally, in the UN millennium declaration
146 we can find several declara-
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tions to promote democracy
147 or to strengthen the capacity of UN member states for democrati-
zation
148. 
2.   Regional Developments 
Indications for an increasing acceptance of democracy as an international legal principle cannot 
only be found at universal, but also at regional level. As the following analysis will show, there 
are, however, significant differences between the various regions. 
(a)   Americas 
(α)   Organization of American States 
The most extensive guarantees concerning democracy – outside the European Union – can be 
found in the system of the Organization of American States (OAS). On the one hand, art. 23 of 
the American Convention of Human Rights
149 prescribes the right to participate in democratic 
elections. Furthermore, the promotion of democracy is, according to art. 2 lit. b of the OAS 
Charter
150, one of the principal objectives of the organization. Art. 9 of the OAS Charter pro-
vides the possibility to suspend membership rights of a Member State if the elected government 
of the latter has been overthrown by force. The mechanism governing the suspension of mem-
bership rights has been outlined in a more detailed way in the Inter-American Democratic Char-
ter
151, which was adopted by the OAS General Assembly on September 11, 2001.
152 The Charter 
guarantees the American peoples a right to democracy and establishes an implementation 
mechanism in its art. 17-22. Although, as resolution of the General Assembly the democratic 
Charter has no directly binding force, the established implementation mechanism can, according 
to art. 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT)
153, be regarded as specifica-
tion of OAS Charter art. 9.
154 
This sanction mechanism has been applied several times in practice. The baptism of fire came 
shortly after the adoption of resolution 1080, when Haiti’s president Aristide was ousted in Sep-
tember 1991. The Permanent Council convened immediately, condemned the coup and requested 
the reinstallation of Aristide.
155 Two days later, the OAS suspended the trade relations with Haiti 
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and all forms of non-humanitarian aid.
156 Subsequently, the United Nations assumed the case. 
Two years after the coup, they finally authorized the United States to intervene with military 
means, thus forcing the military junta to step down.
157 
In April 1992, the Peruvian president Fujimori staged an auto-coup, in which he dissolved the 
parliament and commanded the arrest of several members of the opposition. The Permanent 
Council of the OAS expressly condemned this action.
158 The international community suspended 
several loans which had been envisaged to support the country. The international pressure 
prompted Fujimori to concede the election of a constitutional assembly in November 1992. The 
effectiveness of these international measures was limited, however, as Fujimori won the elec-
tions and maintained his power in the end.
159 One year later, Jorge Serrano Elías, the president of 
Guatemala, also initiated an auto-coup. He dissolved the parliament, suspended several constitu-
tional rights and dismissed the judges of the constitutional court. The sanctions of the OAS were 
much more severe than in the case of Peru.
160 The Permanent Council condemned Serrano’s 
coup unanimously and forced him finally to step down and to flee to El Salvador. 
In 2000, Peru again came into the focus of public attention. The OAS sent a mission to Peru in 
order to monitor the presidential elections. However, the monitoring mission perceived itself to 
be unable to guarantee the technical minimum standards for the vote counting of the decisive 
ballot between Fujimori and his contender, Alejandro Toledo. The OAS thus canceled the mis-
sion. In its report to the Secretary General, the delegation called the elections insufficient with 
regard to international standards.
161 Despite this report, the member states of the OAS could not 
agree to condemn Peru on the basis of resolution 1080. The Permanent Council adopted a com-
promise and sent a mission to Peru in order to investigate the case in more detail. The mission 
was, however, not completed because Fujimori stumbled on a corruption scandal and had to cede 
power. 
In February 2004, Haiti’s president Aristide was toppled a second time. A three-week rebellion 
forced him to step down and to leave the country. The president of the Supreme Court, Boniface 
Alexandre, succeeded Aristide as transitional president. The reaction of the international com-
munity was much more lukewarm than thirteen years earlier. The General Assembly of the OAS 
reacted four months later, adopting a resolution in which it called upon Haiti to return to democ-
racy and condemning the committed acts of violence.
162 However, the OAS neither authorized 
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formal sanctions, nor did it suspend membership rights.
163 The reason for this mild international 
reaction was probably Aristide’s weak legitimacy.
164 He had still been elected in 2000, but the 
elections had been subject to irregularities. Furthermore, many human rights organizations con-
demned Aristide for the deteriorating human rights situation and the political violence in the 
country. This case demonstrates that the OAS treats coups d’état in a differentiated manner. Not 
every coup is automatically condemned. Rather, the perceived legitimacy of the ousted head of 
state has a decisive influence on the reaction of the OAS. 
(β)   Regional Organizations 
References to democracy are, however, not limited to the OAS. Legal documents referring to 
democracy and elections can also be found in the framework of some Latin American regional 
organizations. In 1998, the Member States of the Andean Community (Comunidad Andina – 
CAN) adopted the Andean Community Commitment to Democracy
165 as a legally binding addi-
tional protocol to the founding statute of the CAN, the Cartagena Agreement.
166 Save a commit-
ment to democracy in art. 1, the protocol sets up a sanction mechanism (art. 4), which enables 
coercive measures ranging from the suspension of membership rights (lit. a) to the disallowance 
of the eligibility for loans of the financial institutions of the CAN (lit. c) if the democratic order 
is disrupted (art. 2). Furthermore, art. 13 of the Human Rights Charter of the CAN
167 prescribes a 
right of the Andean peoples to democracy, which is further specified in the arts. 14-18. 
A similar mechanism was installed in the framework of the MERCOSUR. In 1996, the heads of 
state of the four Member States adopted a declaration for democracy
168, in which the establish-
ment and maintenance of democratic institutions is regarded as a fundamental precondition for 
the cooperation within the MERCOSUR (para. 1). Violations may lead to the suspension of 
membership rights (para. 4). With the protocol of Ushuaia
169, this mechanism has been trans-
formed into an international treaty that has been extended also to Bolivia and Chile, countries not 
currently members of the MERCOSUR. 
The system of Central American Integration (Sistema de Integración Centroamericana – SICA) 
has included the promotion and strengthening of democracy as one of the principal objectives of 
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the organization into art. 3 of its founding statute, the protocol of Tegucigalpa.
170 This objective 
was confirmed in 1995 by concluding the treaty on democratic security in Central America
171, 
which affirms that SICA is based on the principles of democracy and the rule of law, leading to 
the obligation to elect governments in universal, free and secret elections (art. 1 (1)). 
(b)   Europe 
As for the Americas, the institutional design of Europe’s international organisations shows a 
great commitment to democracy. Art. 3 of the first additional protocol to the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights
172 prescribes the right to participate in democratic elections. In contrast to 
the OAS, however, the democracy principle has not been enshrined in the founding Statute of the 
Council of Europe
173. In its art. 3, it says that the Member States „must accept the principles of 
the rule of law and of the enjoyment by all persons within its jurisdiction of human rights and 
fundamental  freedoms, and collaborate sincerely and effectively in the realisation of the objec-
tive of the Council as specified in Chapter I.” 
Although missing in the operative part of the statute, democracy is mentioned in the preamble. 
There, democracy is described as a value which originates from the “spiritual and moral values 
which are the common heritage of the [European] peoples”.
174 According to art. 1 lit. a of the 
Statute, the realization of the latter principles is one of the main objectives of the organization. 
In practice, the level of democratization had an influence on the membership in the Council of 
Europe. When, in 1967, the parliamentary democracy in Greece was succeeded by a military 
dictatorship, the parliamentary assembly recommended the exclusion of Greece to the Commit-
tee of Ministers. Greece preceded this step by quitting the Council of Europe on December 12, 
1969. Equally, Portugal and Spain were admitted as members only after the reintroduction of 
democracy in both countries.
175 After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the admission of Rus-
sia to the Council was delayed for several years. The reason was, inter alia, a report of experts 
testifying about Russia that it had departed on its journey towards democracy, but had not yet 
arrived.
176 
In the context of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Heads of State and 
Government declared in the Charter of Paris that they would promote democracy as the only ad-
missible form of government. In essence, the democracy principle is specified as an implementa-
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tion of the will of the people by means of free and fair elections and the respect of the rule of 
law. Although the Charter of Paris is no international treaty with immediately binding force, it 
can – according to VCLT art. 31 – be used as a tool of interpretation in order to specify existing 
obligations such as those of the Council of Europe.
177 
The supranational institution, in which the democracy principle is developed the strongest – but 
in which it is also criticized the most – is the European Union.
178 According to art. 6 (1) of the 
Treaty on European Union
179, democracy is one of the fundamental principles of the EU. It is 
part of the acquis communautaire, which every potentially new member has to observe in order 
to be admitted to the EU. Moreover, TEU art. 7 provides a sharp mechanism of sanctions accord-
ing to which certain membership rights may be suspended if TEU art. 6 (1) is violated.
180 
(c)   Africa 
(α)   African Union 
In the context of the African Union (AU), art. 13 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights
181 does not mention a right to elections explicitly. However, it guarantees a right to par-
ticipate in the conduct of public affairs. According to the African Commission on Human Rights, 
this participation requires the legitimation of sovereign power through elections.
182 Furthermore, 
art. 3 lit. g and art. 4 lit. m of the AU Charter
183 mention the promotion and the respect of de-
mocratic principles and institutions as a fundamental objective of the AU. Moreover, the AU and 
its predecessor, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), have established protection mecha-
nisms against coups d’état. The beginning was a resolution of the African Commission of Hu-
man Rights, dating from 1994, which condemned military overthrows of government and ap-
pealed to military regimes to transfer their power to elected governments.
184 
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In practice, the turning point was the ousting of Ahmed Kabbah in Sierra Leone in 1997.
185 The 
OAU supported the military intervention of the ECOWAS
186 and called upon the international 
community to deny the recognition to the junta of Paul Koroma.
187 It reacted similarly in re-
sponse to military coups on the Comoros, in the Ivory Coast and in Niger and did not recognize 
the rebels as legitimate governments of the respective states.
188 
This position was translated into a legal rule with the foundation of the AU. The AU Charter 
contains, beneath the mentioned commitments to democracy, a condemnation of unconstitutional 
coups d’état (art. 4 lit. p). The implementation mechanism is embodied in art. 30 of the AU 
Charter, according to which membership rights of states, in which the government has come to 
power by unconstitutional means, may be suspended. Reading AU Charter art. 30 together with 
the guarantee of the democracy principle in art. 4 lit. m of the Charter suggests an interpretation 
of art. 30 according to which only the ousting of elected regimes is subject to the mentioned 
sanctions.
189 
The sanctions mechanism is specified by a declaration of the Heads of State and Government of 
the AU/OAU.
190 The declaration provides a period of six months in which the concerned state 
shall have the opportunity to restore its constitutional order. During this time, it shall be sus-
pended from the policy-making organs of the AU/OAU. If it does not comply with this obliga-
tion, sanctions may be instituted. The declaration contains a non-exhaustive list of possible sanc-
tions, ranging from the denial of visas for members of the government in question, via restriction 
of government-to-government contacts, to trade restrictions. 
The mechanism has been applied in several cases. The participation of the Central African Re-
public in the organs of the AU was suspended after the elected president Ange-Félix Patassé had 
been overthrown by military force.
191 The suspension was withdrawn after presidential elections 
had been held in 2005.
192 As Faure Gnassingbé captured power in Togo by military force after 
the death of his father in February 2005, the AU condemned the coup, suspended Togo’s mem-
bership rights and welcomed the sanctions which had been established by the ECOWAS.
193 This 
pressure prompted Gnassingbé to step down and hold elections, which he finally won. The Peace 
and Security Council reacted by readmitting Togo’s government.
194 
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However, the current practice is problematic in a two-fold way. In certain respects, it is too far-
reaching, and in others, it is not inclusive enough.
195 So far, military coups have been con-
demned, notwithstanding the legitimacy of the ousted regime. There is, thus, a danger that the 
mechanism is an instrument to cement the status quo rather than a motor of democratization.
196 
For example, the Mauritanian president Taya, whose legitimacy was questionable at best, was 
overthrown in a bloodless coup in August 2005. Although the military government announced 
that it would hold elections within two years and excluded its own participation, the coup was 
condemned by the African Union and made subject to sanctions.
197 However, some African poli-
ticians voiced critique. The South African ambassador to Mauritania, for example, declared: 
„[Although] the principle of the AU is not to agree with coups, [...] we believe we shall not have 
one policy to fit every situation.“
198 
However, the sanctions against Mauritania were only lifted after the presidential elections in 
spring 2007.
199 In two other cases, in which the coup was directed against regimes of doubtful 
legitimacy, the AU only issued a formal condemnation without imposing further sanctions. The 
military coup against a corrupt regime in the Ivory Coast in December 1999 was formally con-
demned, but the transitional government was recognized quite quickly thereafter.
200 In 2003, 
president Kumba Yalla was ousted in Guinea-Bissau after having dissolved the parliament and 
having adopted some dictatorial decrees. Equally, the AU formally condemned the coup, but did 
not impose further sanctions.
201 
In contrast, the AU is very reluctant when it comes to other constitutional infringements, like 
falsifying elections or changing the constitution in order to capture more power or to permit an 
additional term in office.
202 However, there may recently have been a step in the right direc-
tion.
203 In Madagaskar, the AU imposed sanctions reacting on a constitutional infringement be-
low the threshold of a military coup. In 2001, Madagascar had a constitutional crisis, when Marc 
Ravalomanana got the most votes, but failed to get an absolute majority against president Didier 
Ratsiraka. This result led to demonstrations in the whole country. On mediation of the AU, a 
commission of the Supreme Court was authorized to count the votes for a second time. Accord-
ing to this vote count, Ravalomanana had gained the absolute majority. However, he declared 
himself president and captured power by military means. The AU reacted by not recognizing the 
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new government and requested Mr. Ravalomanana to hold new elections. Furthermore, it sus-
pended Madagascar’s participation in the organs of the AU.
204 
(β)   Regional Organizations 
Some regional organizations in Africa have established mechanisms which are similar to the one 
of the AU. For the ECOWAS, the heads of state and government have declared in the Declara-
tion of Political Principles of the ECOWAS
205 in 1991 in Abuja: 
We believe in the liberty of the individual and in his inalienable right to participate 
by means of free and democratic processes in the framing of the society in which he 
lives. We will therefore strive to encourage and promote in each our countries, politi-
cal pluralism and those representative institutions and guarantees for personal safety 
and freedom under the law that are our common heritage.
206 
The essence of this declaration was introduced into the ECOWAS treaty
207 in 1993. Art. 4 lit. h 
and j regard participation in the conduct of government and the promotion of democracy as one 
of the fundamental principles of the organization. Moreover, art. 58 (2) lit. g offers support in the 
organization of elections upon the request of a Member State. These principles have been con-
firmed by the heads of state and government of the ECOWAS in the Protocol on Democracy and 
Good Governance
208, which explicitly emphasizes the obligation to hold free, fair and transpar-
ent elections:  
The following shall be declared as constitutional principles shared by all Member 
States: 
[…] 
b) Every accession to power must be made through free, fair and transparent elec-
tions. 
c) Zero tolerance for power obtained or maintained by unconstitutional means. 
d) Popular participation in decision-making, strict adherence to democratic principles 
and decentralization of power at all levels of governance.
209 
The promotion of democracy is also enshrined in art. 4 lit. c of the founding statute of the South 
African Development Community (SADC)
210 as one the fundamental principles. According to 
art. 5 (1), the objectives of the organization feature, among others, the promotion of common 
political values “which are transmitted through institutions which are democratic, legitimate and 
effective” (lit. b) and the consolidation, defense and maintenance of democracy (lit. c). These 
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principles are concretized by the SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elec-
tions
211, which were adopted by the SADC summit in Mauritius in August 2004. 
(d)   Asia 
The continent that is the most reluctant with regard to the promotion of democracy is Asia. There 
is neither a political organization nor a human rights treaty covering the whole continent. Indeed, 
there are some sub-regional institutions and treaty mechanisms, which show, however, little en-
thusiasm towards the idea of electoral legitimacy and democracy. For the Arab region, the Coun-
cil of the League of Arab States adopted the Arab Charter on Human Rights
212 in 1994. How-
ever, the Charter does not mention any right to participation in elections or even to democracy. 
Certainly, one of the most active political organizations on the Asian continent is the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
213 Although ASEAN originally had a strong emphasis on 
the sovereignty of each member with regard to the form of government,
214 there have recently 
been modest trends towards a stronger commitment to democracy.
215 While the founding docu-
ments are mute with regard to the internal organization of the member states, democracy has for 
the first time been mentioned in the Vientiane Action Program (VAP) of the ASEAN Heads of 
State and Government.
216 Under title II of the VAP, the enhancement of democracy is mentioned 
as one of the goals of ASEAN. Further specifications are lacking, however, a circumstance 
which suggests that the inclusion of democracy among the principles is nothing but mere rheto-
ric.
217 The teleological nature of the applied language is noticeable nonetheless: there is no strict 
right to democracy, but democracy is enhanced and this enhancement is a goal, not an obligation. 
(e)   Evaluation 
The analysis of the emergence of different regional commitments to democracy provides an in-
coherent picture. In Europe and in the Americas, a democracy principle has been established as 
part of regional customary law.
218 The human rights treaties, on the one hand, and the founding 
statutes of the regional political organizations, on the other, contain extensive electoral and de-
mocratic guarantees. Furthermore, there are effective sanction mechanisms for states which do 
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not meet democratic standards. In particular in Europe, these sanctions do not only concentrate 
on the existence or absence of elections, but try to implement a more substantive vision of de-
mocracy. 
For Africa, the evaluation is less clear. The African Union has included democracy as one fun-
damental objective in its founding statute. Furthermore, the Banjul Charter prescribes a right to 
participation in the conduct of public affairs. However, although many African states have still to 
be classified as non-democratic, there is no active institutional promotion of democracy. The 
established sanction mechanisms exclusively refer to regressions in the process of democratiza-
tion, which suggests a teleological rather than a strict reading of the established democracy prin-
ciple. 
The least developed commitments to democracy can be found in Asia. There are only modest 
allusions to democracy in a Plan of Action of the Heads of State and Government of ASEAN 
which are not sufficient to establish a corresponding democracy principle. This lack of commit-
ment to democracy on the regional level is in line with the reluctance of South East Asian states 
to enter into treaty obligations concerning political rights at the universal level. 
3.   Democracy and the Use of Force 
The most attention in the literature on the emergence of a democracy principle has been absorbed 
by military interventions in the name of democracy. Such interventions could be an indicator for 
the emergence of a customary principle with regard to democracy. The following analysis will 
concentrate on five possible precedents: on the one hand, the unilateral military interventions of 
the United States in Grenada, Panama and Iraq (a); on the other hand, the interventions in Haiti 
and Sierra Leone, which were approved by the U.N. Security Council (b). 
(a)   Unilateral Interventions in Grenada, Panama and Iraq 
Reacting to a coup d’état against the government of Maurice Bishop, U.S. troops invaded Gre-
nada on October 25, 1983 with the support of neighboring Caribbean states. Three days after the 
invasion, the U.S. military succeeded in overthrowing the military council which had come to 
power after the coup d’état. In the subsequent debate among legal scholars on the legality of the 
U.S. intervention, some authors put forward the restoration of democracy as a legal justifica-
tion.
219 However, there are several reasons against such an interpretation: First, Bishop himself 
attained power not by democratic means, but by a coup d’état in 1979.
220 Second, restoration of 
democracy was not put forward by the U.S. administration in its attempt to justify the interven-
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tion.
221  Only the subsequent evaluation of the intervention by academic commentators is barely 
sufficient as a basis for an emerging practice or opinio iuris.
222 Finally and most importantly, the 
U.N. General Assembly condemned the intervention as illegal with an overwhelming majority 
(108-9-27).
223 Certainly, resolutions of the U.N. General Assembly are not directly binding. 
However, they are expression of the opinio iuris of the international community that the inter-
vention cannot be regarded as a precedent for the emergence of a right to a pro-democratic inter-
vention.
224 
A second potential precedent for democracy as a title for intervention is the U.S. invasion in Pa-
nama in 1989.
225 On December 20, 1989, the U.S. army invaded Panama in order to overthrow 
the regime of Manuel Noriega and to capture the head of state himself. Among other reasons, 
like the protection of U.S. citizens, the combat of drug trafficking, and the implementation of the 
Panama Canal treaties, President George Bush Sr. explicitly mentioned the protection of democ-
racy as justification for the intervention.
226 However, the U.N. General Assembly again con-
demned the intervention with a clear majority (75-20-40) as illegal.
227 Therefore, the intervention 
in Panama may not serve as precedent for the emergence of a democracy principle in interna-
tional law either.
228 
The most recent case in which regime change was discussed as justification for the beginning of 
a war was the invasion of the U.S. and the “Coalition of the Willing” in Iraq in March 2003.
229 In 
                                        
221   Oscar Schachter, The Legality of Pro-Democratic Invasion, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 645, 648 (1984); Michael 
Byers & Simon Chesterman, "You, the People": pro-democratic intervention in international law, in DE-
MOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 259, 273 (Gregory H. Fox & Brad R. Roth eds., 2000). 
222   Wouters, De Meester & Ryngaert, supra note 120, at 169. 
223   G.A. Res. 38/7, U.N. Doc. A/RES/38/7 (Nov. 2, 1983): „Deeply deplores the armed intervention in Grenada, 
which constitutes a flagrant violation of international law and of the independence, sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of that state.“ (emphasis in the original). 
224    SCOTT DAVIDSON, GRENADA:  A  STUDY IN POLITICS AND THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL  LAW 147 
(1987); Byers & Chesterman, supra note 221, at 274. 
225   Abraham D. Sofaer, The Legality of the United States Action in Panama, 29 COL. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 281, 288-
90 (1991); William Michael Reisman, Humanitarian Intervention and Fledging Democracies, 19 FORDHAM 
INT'L L. J. 794, 800 (1995); TESÓN, supra note 219, at 269. But see also Anthony D'Amato, The Invasion of 
Panama Was a Lawful Response to Tyranny, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 516, 519 (1990) (referring to the human 
rights violations of the Noriega regime and explicitly rejecting the possibility of a pro-democratic interven-
tion). 
226   President George Bush, Address to the Nation Announcing United States Military Action in Panama, ¶ 2 
(Dec. 20, 1989), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/print.php?pid=17965. 
227   G.A. Res. 44/240, U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/240 (Dec. 29, 1989): „Strongly deplores the intervention in Panama 
by the armed forces of the United States of America, which constitutes a flagrant violation of international 
law and of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of states.“ (emphasis in the original). 
228   Ved P. Nanda, The Validity of United States Intervention in Panama under International Law, 84 AM. J. 
INT'L L. 494, 500 (1990); John Quigley, The Legality of the United States Invasion of Panama, 15 YALE J. 
INT'L L. 276, 303-6 (1990); Oscar Schachter, Is There a Right to Overthrow an Illegitimate Regime?, in LE 
DROIT INTERNATIONAL AU SERVICE DE LA PAIX, DE LA JUSTICE ET DU DEVELOPPEMENT. MÉLANGES MICHEL 
VIRALLY 423, 428 (Jean Boulouis & René-Jean Dupuy eds., 1991); Louis Henkin, The Invasion of Panama 
Under International Law: A Gross Violation, 29 COL. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 293, 298 (1991); Sarah A. Rumage, 
Panama and the Myth of Humanitarian Intervention in U.S. Foreign Policy: Neither Legal Nor Moral, Nei-
ther Just Nor Right, 10 ARIZONA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 54-57 (1993); IAN BROWNLIE, THE RULE OF LAW 
IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 59-62 (1998); Byers & Chesterman, supra note 221, at 275 
229   See Davis Brown, Iraq and the 800-Pound-Gorilla Revisited: Good and Bad Faith, and Humanitarian Inter-
vention, 28 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1 (2004); Robert F. Turner, Operation Iraqi Freedom: Legal 
and Policy Considerations, 27 HARV. J. L. & PUBL. POL'Y 765, 778 (2004); TESÓN, supra note 219, at 392 35 
his State of the Union address on January 28, 2003, President George W. Bush declared: „And 
tonight I have a message for the brave and oppressed people of Iraq: Your enemy is not sur-
rounding your country - your enemy is ruling your country. And the day he and his regime are 
removed from power will be the day of your liberation.“
230 
Among the political considerations, which finally led to the war, Iraq’s democratization was a 
major reason. It is telling, however, that neither the U.S. nor Great Britain mentioned regime 
change as title for intervention in their official legal justifications of the Iraq war.
231 The inter-




234 of the U.N. Security Council.
235 Furthermore, the intervention was condemned by a con-
siderable part of the international community. Among the opponents were states like Belgium, 
Canada, China, Germany, France, New Zealand, Russia, Sweden and Switzerland. Thus, the Iraq 
war can equally not be regarded as precedent for the emergence of an international democracy 
principle.
236 
(b)   Collective Interventions in Haiti and Sierra Leone 
In the search for precedents for the emergence of a democracy principle in international law, col-
lective interventions, which have been authorized by an international institution, might be more 
promising indices than the unilateral interventions we have examined so far. In this respect, 
many legal scholars qualify the intervention in Haiti in 1991, which had been authorized by the 
U.N. Security Council, as a paradigmatic precedent.
237 In 1990, Jean-Bertrand Aristide was 
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elected as Haitian president with 67% of the votes.
238 The elections were monitored by the 
United Nations
239 and the OAS
240 upon Haiti’s request. On September 30, 1991, Aristide was 
overthrown by the military. After remaining passive in the beginning, the U.N. Security Council 
adopted Resolution 841 in June 1993, which imposed economic sanctions on Haiti.
241 Because of 
the sanctions, the military regime in Haiti agreed to conclude the so-called Governors Islands 
agreement, in which it conceded to bring Aristide back into power.  However, the implementa-
tion of the agreement failed when members of the junta exercised force against partisans of Aris-
tide in autumn 1993. The Security Council again adopted economic sanctions
242 and set up a na-
val blockade
243. On July 31, 1994, it finally adopted Resolution 940, which permitted all U.N. 
member states to use force to reinstall the legitimate government in Haiti.
244 On September 18, 
the former U.S. President Jimmy Carter convinced the junta – with the support of Senator Sam 
Nunn and General Colin Powell – to cede power to Aristide and to leave the country, just hours 
before a multinational troop under U.S. leadership was going to land in Haiti. 
Several authors deny the intervention in Haiti the character as a precedent for a collective pro-
democratic intervention. Some argue that the Security Council primarily addresses the protection 
of peace and security in the region.
245 However, this reference has to be seen in the context of the 
new activism of the Security Council in the 1990s. In a series of resolutions, the Security Coun-
cil interpreted the notion of peace and security in Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter broadly. Peace 
and security was not only understood as the absence of the use of military force. It also referred 
to internal crises in order to cover catastrophes such as in Somalia or Rwanda.
246 While formally 
respecting the text of the Charter, the Security Council has, with overwhelming support of the 
legal literature,
247 broadened its competences in order to cope with the changed circumstances 
after the end of the Cold War. Thus, despite the reference to peace and security in the region, 
Resolution 940 was clearly focused on the restoration of the internal order in Haiti.
248 
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Some scholars doubted the competence of the U.N. Security Council to authorize an intervention 
in order to restore democracy.
249 Others argued that the case of Haiti could not be generalized 
because of the specific regional context.
250 Further commentators refer to the general human 
rights situation in Haiti
251 or the violation of the Governors Islands Agreement as a justification 
for the Security Council resolution.
252 However, these objections cannot call into question that 
the restoration of democracy was the explicit objective of resolution 940. This is, on the one 
hand, expressed in the preamble: “Reaffirming that the goal of the international community re-
mains the restoration of democracy in Haiti and the prompt return of the legitimately elected 
President, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, within the framework of the Governors Island Agreement”
253. 
On the other hand, the support of the legitimate government of Haiti also plays an important role 
in the operative part: 
1.  Welcomes the report of the Secretary-General of 15 July 1994 (S/1994/828) and 
takes note of his support for action under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United 
Nations in order to assist the legitimate Government of Haiti in the maintenance of 
public order; 
[…] 
4.  Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, authorizes Mem-
ber States to form a multinational force under unified command and control and, in 
this framework, to use all necessary means to facilitate the departure from Haiti of 
the military leadership, consistent with the Governors Island Agreement, the prompt 
return of the legitimately elected President and the restoration of the legitimate au-
thorities of the Government of Haiti, and to establish and maintain a secure and sta-
ble environment that will permit implementation of the Governors Island Agreement, 
on the understanding that the cost of implementing this temporary operation will be 
borne by the participating Member States
254 
Although the preamble also refers to the human rights situation in Haiti,
255 the latter does not 
have the same importance as the restoration of the legitimate order as becomes apparent in the 
operative part.
256 Furthermore, the reference to the Governors Islands Agreement is not essential, 
but only supportive. It has to be taken into account that it was the main purpose of the agreement 
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to reinstall the preceding order. It is not plausible why the Security Council should have had the 
competence to implement an agreement between a de facto regime and a de jure government, 
independent of its content. Even if it was the purpose of the resolution to implement the Gover-
nors Islands agreement, this was just because of the content of the latter. The normative concerns 
with regard to the competence of the Security Council, finally, are irrelevant for the examination 
of a practice and an opinio iuris on the emergence of a democracy principle.
257 Only the recep-
tion of the intervention by the international community is of importance in this respect.  
Nevertheless, the scope of the Haiti precedent is limited.
258 The intervention addressed the resto-
ration of a disrupted, but previously already existing, constitutional order. It can, thus, not be 
regarded as an indicator for the emergence of a universal democracy or legitimacy principle. 
However, it fits into the patterns we have already observed in the context of the resolutions of 
the General Assembly. If the democracy principle in international law is teleological and proc-
ess-oriented, then countries are indeed not obliged to turn into a democracy from one day to the 
other. Teleology, however, prohibits setbacks in the process of democratization. If collective in-
terventions, such as the intervention in Haiti, occur after coups d’état against elected govern-
ments, this practice confirms the principle of democratic teleology. 
In a similar line is the second precedent, the intervention of Nigeria, or of ECOWAS respec-
tively, in Sierra Leone. In the latter, a country plagued by Civil War, the parties of the conflict 
agreed in 1996 to hold presidential elections. In these elections, Ahmad Tejan Kabbah was 
elected for president. As the Rebel Unity Front (RUF) did not only lose the elections, but was 
also weakened on the battlefield, the parties concluded the Abidjan Accord on September 30, 
1996, in which they agreed on an immediate ceasefire and the disarmament of the combatants. 
This agreement did, however, not contribute to a détente. On the contrary, on May 25, 1997, the 
president of Sierra Leone was overthrown. This prompted the Nigerian troops of the ECOWAS 
Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) to intervene. In June 1997, the Nigerian forces invaded Sierra 
Leone and helped to reinstall Kabbah as president in March 1998. The U.N. Security Council did 
not approve the intervention until afterwards. In October 1997, the Security Council expressed 
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its support for the ECOWAS action,
259 and on March 16, 1998 it welcomed the return of presi-
dent Kabbah into office.
260 
The legal literature discusses different justifications for the ECOMOG intervention: they range 
from a pro-democratic intervention,
261 via a humanitarian intervention,
262 to an intervention on 
invitation by the de jure government.
263 Some authors have raised doubts concerning the democ-
ratic intention of the intervening states, as Nigeria, being the leader of the intervention, was itself 
ruled by an autocratic government.
264 However, in order to evaluate the character of the interven-
tion as a precedent, the reception by the international community is more important than the in-
tention of the intervening parties, because the former is the indication for the existence of an 
opinio iuris. The Security Council resolutions on Sierra Leone emphasize the restoration of the 
democratic order. Resolution 1132 asks the military junta to restore the democratic order,
265 
while resolution 1156 welcomes the return to democracy.
266 Therefore, the case of Sierra Leone 
confirms the patterns we have observed with regard to Haiti. The international community re-
gards the overthrow of an elected government as violation of international law,
267 which con-
firms the existence of a principle of democratic teleology in international law. 
4.   Résumé 
International law does not provide for a strict right to democratic governance. The international 
documents and the corresponding practice rather emphasize the process-oriented character of 
democratization. Democracy is perceived as a teleological principle.
268 States and societies are 
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thus obliged to develop towards democracy. In this context, democratization has two directions 
of impact.
269 On the one hand, it is directed against democratic erosion, regressions in the proc-
ess of democratization. These can be obvious cases, such as military coups. This is underlined by 
the practice of the U.N. Security Council, which endorsed military action after elected govern-
ments had been overthrown in Haiti and Sierra Leone. In contrast, the sole illegitimacy of a re-
gime has never been a reason for the Security Council to take any action. 
But regressions are not limited to coups d’état. They also include other setbacks in the process of 
democratization and consolidation of democracy, such as increasing centralizations of power 
with the head of the executive or the cession of political control to the military. Examples are the 
autogolpe of Alberto Fujimori in Peru in 1992 or the ‘constitutional referendum’ of Alexander 
Lukashenko in Belarus in 1995.
270 This is emphasized, in particular, by the sanction mechanisms 
of the OAS and the AU. Both are meant to impose sanctions not only for military coups, but also 
for other measures intended to erode democracy. The regional practice is more reluctant in cases 
in which formal elections have been held, but if these have been falsified by undue influence. In 
theory, however, such cases equally constitute setbacks in the process of democratization, which 
run counter to the principle of democratic teleology. 
On the other hand, democratization is not only concerned with avoiding setbacks and regres-
sions. There is also a second aspect, which concerns the positive and active development towards 
democracy and, once the transition has occurred, towards democratic consolidation. As we lack 
an ideal type of democracy as well as an ideal way of democratization, however, this second as-
pect cannot be turned into a concrete obligation to perform a specific action. Governments have 
a certain margin of appreciation in this respect, and we can only classify those strategies as ille-
gal which are clearly defective. In order to determine such strategies, we may adopt the same 
classification which I have proposed in the context of the principle of self-determination.
271 Ac-
cording to this proposal, regimes which are not self-enriching, but development-oriented, and 
which observe core human rights have to be regarded as legal and legitimate. Legitimacy under 
international law does therefore not necessarily require a state to be democratic. 
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IV.   Conclusion 
Nearly two decades after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the democracy euphoria of scholars in inter-
national relations and international law cooled down considerably. Democracy is not the cure-all 
it was widely considered to be. Moreover, the third wave of democratization
272 was weaker in 
the end than many observers had foreseen in the beginning of the 1990s. Even though there is 
nearly a consensus in philosophy and political sciences that, in the long run, there can be no suit-
able alternative to democracy as a form of state, we have seen that democratization is not purely 
a simple change of the political status. Instead, it is a long-term and complex social process and 
its preconditions are still very much under discussion in social science research. 
This contribution has attempted to meet these concerns by framing democracy as a teleological 
principle. In international law, democracy is neither an absolute right nor a strict obligation. The 
identified norm rather focuses on the process-like character of democratization. States are merely 
obliged to develop towards democracy. This understanding of the democratic principle in inter-
national law can also better be reconciled with the existing legal documents. These do not use a 
prescriptive, but rather a process-oriented language. The concrete development of the process of 
democratization is, to a large extent, part of the appreciation of each state. 
Because of the binary character of legal norms, lawyers like to have clear standards. Karl-Heinz 
Ladeur once offered a metaphor in which he compared the law to a blind man who uses a stick in 
order to scan the ground on which he is walking.
273 In this process, he always makes the distinc-
tion between a stable and an unstable ground. In so doing, he creates a system of orientation 
without being able to evaluate the world in its whole complexity. Lawyers act in a similar fash-
ion when they merely ask about the legality or the illegality of certain actions or conditions. In 
this context, they need standards that allow them to make clear binary distinctions. The stricter 
legal standards are, the higher the determinacy of legal norms is. Against this background, the 
principle of democratic teleology does not deserve very good marks. Whether a state has held 
elections or not is a question of fact that can be answered quite easily.
274 In contrast, the question 
whether a government acts in the interest of its population requires difficult normative valua-
tions. 
However, strict normative standards do not always take into account the complexity of reality. 
Martti Koskenniemi has shown in his dissertation that the determinacy of international legal 
norms is always subject to a necessary structural deficit.
275 According to Koskenniemi, absolute 
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legal standards are always either over- or under-inclusive.
276 International law thus suffers from 
an inherent tension between determinacy and justice. The more determinate legal standards are, 
the less apt they are to take into account the complexity of reality; and the more they adjust to 
complexity, the less determinate they are.
277 International law, in particular, depending in its ef-
fectiveness on the acceptance of the actors it addresses, cannot afford to impose strict standards 
if the evaluation of different circumstances and strategies is as diverse as in the context of global 
democratization.   
Francis Fukuyama’s diagnosis of “the end of history”
278 has been premature. Democracy still has 
a long way to go and this is reflected by the present state of international law. In the legal debate 
of the 1990s, even those authors favourable of the democratic entitlement did not claim the un-
conditional establishment of a right to democratic governance.
279 Instead, most of them have 
identified a democratic trend
280 or, most famously, an emerging right to democratic govern-
ance.
281 The preceding analysis suggests reformulating this thesis: international law contains a 
teleological democracy principle, a right to the emergence of democratic governance. 
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